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ABSTRACT
Ride-hailing, in addition to a common mode of daily 
transportation, is an attractive option for evacuating strand-
ed passengers and supplementing bus bridging in the early 
stages of an urban rail transit (URT) disruption. This paper 
proposes a service supply chain comprised of ride-hailing 
vehicles, ride-hailing platforms, and stranded passengers 
wherein the URT and ride-hailing chain together provide 
emergency evacuation services. The emergency evacu-
ation service supply chain can be coordinated under an 
effort-based revenue sharing contract. A URT-dominated 
Stackelberg game model between the URT and ride-hailing 
platform is then formulated to optimize compensation de-
cisions on the part of the URT; numerical analysis reveals 
critical factors affecting the said decisions. The main contri-
butions of this paper are two-fold: first, it provides new infor-
mation regarding collaboration between URT operators and 
ride-hailing platforms for stranded passenger evacuation, in-
cluding a ride-hailing platform pricing strategy; and second, 
the URT compensation decision process is solved via Stack-
elberg game model while revealing an incentive coefficient 
parameter for the URT decision and solver.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Urban rail transit (URT) systems are vital channels 
for commuters and provide necessary support for a 
wide array of mobility demands in metropolitan ar-
eas. However, URT systems are prone to disruptions 
caused by network failures, outbursts of passenger 
flows, natural disasters, and terrorist activities. Time-
ly and effective management procedures are crucial 
to mitigate the societal impact of URT disruptions; it 
is necessary to ensure effective temporary operation 
for unaffected sections as well as recovery services 
for evacuating stranded passengers from the affected 
stations. 
Ride-hailing services have rapidly increased in 
popularity and availability in recent years. There were 
410,000 registered ride-hailing vehicle drivers in 
Shanghai in 2016. Theoretically, an equivalent number 
of vehicles can potentially be used to provide recovery 
services in the case of a URT disruption. Ride-hailing 
services are cheaper than taxis. If the URT provides 
certain compensation in addition, more stranded 
passengers would theoretically be able to transfer to 
ride-hailing vehicles to complete their commute – to 
this effect, ride-hailing may complement bus-bridging 
for disruption recovery. More importantly, ride-hail-
ing vehicles can provide point-to-point service rather 
than feeder service, which is an attractive option for 
passengers on stricter timelines. The URT may benefit 
from cooperating with ride-hailing companies to pro-
vide recovery services to evacuate stranded passen-
gers in the case of a disruption.
This paper focuses on collaboration between a URT 
and ride-hailing company for recovery service during 
railway disruption events. Ride-hailing is explored as 
potential compensation for disrupted URT services, 
the expected profits of participants are analysed, and 
a corresponding URT decision-making technique is es-
tablished. 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW
URT disruption recovery is designed to mitigate 
the effects of a service disruption and recover to the 
original operation state. Disruption management is de-
fined by Jespersen-Groth et al. as the “joint approach 
of the involved organizations to deal with the impact 
of disruptions in order to ensure the best possible 
service for the passengers” [1]. Bus-bridging is the 
most common response to rail service disruption as 
identified in an international survey of rail authorities 
[2]. The extant research on bus-bridging centres on op-
erational issues in terms of route design [3], bridging 
termini locations [4], or reserve bus depot locations 
[5]. Bus-bridging passengers are subjected to at least 
two passive transfers (URT-Bus-URT), which is burden-
some, time-consuming, and representative of a signifi-
cant decline in service satisfaction. Feeder stations in 
the case of bus-bridging may also be overwhelmed by 
the sudden increase in passenger flow as evacuated 
individuals are re-routed through them. 
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3. DELAY MODEL APPROACH
3.1 Incident area
Here, an “incident area” is defined as a set of sta-
tions in the line forced to stop the operation due to a 
disruption in any individual station. In short, the inci-
dent area is comprised of the stations between two 
nearby crossovers. When a station suffers disruption, 
the line can only use the crossovers for temporary 
operation until system recovery. Crossovers act as 
temporary turning lines to ensure the temporary oper-
ations of other sections. The disruption can suspend 
not only the station itself but also any stations near-
by without any crossover. A line can be divided into a 
number of consecutive incident areas according to the 
crossovers; the incident area is defined by the topolog-
ical characteristics [11].
The space-L method was used to draw URT lines 
based on complex network theory. Stations can be 
virtualized into nodes of complex networks, while sec-
tions can be virtualized into links which connect the 
nodes. The URT line can be represented by an undi-
rected graph L (V, E). The node set V={vi|i=1,2,…n} 
represents successive stations and the link set 
E={ei|i=0,1,…n} represents successive sections. The 
set of links equipped with crossovers is denoted as 
' ( ' )E E E3  and the number of crossovers is denoted 
as n(E'). If ek, em! E' and ek, em are adjacent links, the 
incident area can be defined by an undirected graph 
IAm(V', E'). A line can be separated into n(E') -1 consec-
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3.2 Disruption delay model
The bathtub model is used to study the disruptions; 
Figure 1 shows the disruption and the recovery process. 
The system state is denoted as S on y-axis, the time is 
Many previous researchers have explored URT 
disruption recovery. Westerlund Y. et al. [6], for exam-
ple, investigated efforts by public transport systems 
in Sweden and the Netherlands in collaboration with 
taxi companies to provide demand-responsive trans-
port services. Darmanin et al. [7] examined the conse-
quences of disruptions on the Melbourne Metro Train. 
They established a mathematical model with minimal 
commuter “discomfort” under a number of operation-
al constraints. Their model proved able to transport 
more stranded commuters to their designated desti-
nations at any point in time as compared to the current 
strategy.
There have been many other valuable contribu-
tions to the literature in terms of URT policy. Schuite-
ma et al. [8] found that transport pricing acceptability 
is not necessarily low because URT users expect neg-
ative effects in terms of usage of personal vehicles, 
but rather because they are not convinced that public 
transport policies reduce traffic congestion or environ-
mental problems. Zeng et al. [9] explored the effects of 
taxi-based recovery services on short-term disruptions 
in public tram systems, as well as the financial effects 
thereof. The pricing strategy can be a useful tool in 
coordinating various modes of transportation in terms 
of supply chain management [10], inventory manage-
ment [10], and emergency traffic problems [8].
No previous researcher has proposed a direct 
application of a cooperative URT disruption recovery 
plan. Cooperation with ride-hailing companies is, in ef-
fect, a decision-making problem for the URT. How does 
the URT decide whether to cooperate with ride-hailing 
services? How much do they compensate for recov-
ery services, and how do they encourage partners to 
provide the required services on short notice? The ob-
jective of the present study was to establish models 















Figure 1 – URT disruption and recovery process
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duration, which is represented by the shaded area in 
Figure 2. The total delay of stranded passengers is cal-
culated via Equation 3.














Figure 2 – Accumulated passenger change in Delay Model 1
Delay Model 2
When the incident stations resume operation, if 
Q1 > Qc, the line enters a temporary full-load operation 
state. The delay duration continues until no stranded 
passengers are waiting on the platform and passen-
gers continue to wait without leaving the station. The 
delay duration is denoted as Tm=T0+T1+T2. The im-
pacted passengers include the portion who have been 
in the system since the disruption began and the por-
tion who have arrived at the platform within the delay 
time. The accumulative passengers are denoted as: 
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where Qi0 denotes the passengers waiting at station i 
uploaded from the trains out of service plus the pas-
sengers waiting at station i at time T0. The passenger 
volume growth rate is denoted as D}i; the passenger 
arrival rate is denoted as }ai.
During the passenger evacuation phase, it is as-
sumed that there are no impatient passengers leav-
ing the station and that stranded passengers queue 
to board the next train. The passenger departure rate 
is higher than the passenger arrival rate. The stranded 
passengers volume declines at a rate of }id - }ia. The 
total delay caused by the disruption is the shaded area 
in Figure 3 calculated via Equation 5.
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denoted as t on x-axis. When an incident disrupts a 
station at time td, an incident area is formulated. It is 
assumed that the URT supervisor judges and enacts 
rescue measurements at time t0 and that waiting pas-
sengers gather and the system state declines from the 
original state to the emergency state Sd; the duration 
is denoted as T0, the traffic and service level remain 
at a lower level during the emergency state. “Rescue 
measurements” include the removal of dangerous el-
ements, temporary operation, and stranded passen-
gers evacuation. The disruption ends and the incident 
stations are restored at time t1; the duration is denot-
ed as T1. The system state is restored from emergency 
state Sd to original state S0 at time t2, at which point 
there are no more stranded passengers in the system. 
Rescue measurements are completed before t2; the 
duration is denoted as T2.
Tm is used to denote the recovery service duration. 
When the incident stations restore the operation, if 
the number of passengers stranded in the stations is 
small and the stranded passengers can board the first 
arriving train, the delay caused by the disruption has 
ended. If the stranded passengers remain on the plat-
form after the restoration and the capacity of the first 
arriving train is insufficient, the delay continues. Two 
delay models have been designed accordingly: Delay 
Model 1 (delay ends after restoration), and Delay Mod-
el 2 (delay continues after restoration) [12].
Delay Model 1
When the incident station operation is restored, if 
the stranded passengers volume is smaller than the 
remaining capacity of the train (Q1 ≤ Qc), then passen-
gers waiting at the platform can freely board the first 
arriving train. Any passengers arriving subsequently 
are not affected by the disruption. The delay duration 
is denoted as Tm=T0+T1. The impacted passengers 
include those in the system at the time of the disrup-
tion and those who arrived and waited on the platform 
within the delay duration. The accumulative passen-
gers are denoted as:







^ h/  (2)
where Qi0 denotes the passengers waiting at station 
i (who can be counted according to SIM-card data). 
Passengers behave differently depending on the na-
ture and extent of the disruptive incident. They may 
continue to wait at station i for restoration to reach 
their destination, or they may become impatient and 
leave station i [13]. The stranded passenger growth 
rate is denoted as ∆}i=}ia - }iu; }ia denotes the pas-
senger arrival rate at station i and }iu denotes the rate 
at which the impatient passengers leave the station.
The total delay caused by the disruption is deter-
mined by the delay of the original passengers and 
the stranded passengers growth rate during the delay 
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potential vehicles to evacuate the stranded passen-
gers. X must strike a trade-off between the transfer of 
revenue to other vehicles and the quantity of passen-
gers transferred. The disruptions vary in occurrence 
time, duration, and the number of passengers strand-
ed; under certain disruption scenarios. The URT may 
not benefit from the compensatory recovery services. 
The URT must also trade-off its recovery costs and 
passenger services. These factors were taken into ac-
count in designing a model for URT recovery compen-
sation decision-making.
4.1 Notations and assumptions
Our modelling process was conducted using the 
following notations and assumptions.
1)  It is assumed that the stranded passengers wait for 
URT operation restoration. If there is no recovery 
service provided, the societal loss may be denot-
ed as the time value cost. If the URT collaborates 
with X to provide recovery service, some stranded 
passengers may transfer to ride-hailing vehicles for 
their remaining commute, which saves inestimable 
delays. URT pays compensation to X for the recov-
ery service via the interrelation shown in Figure 4.
2)  Aggregate passenger behaviour is considered rath-
er than individual reactions during a disruption. 
During the delay, the volume of aggregate passen-
gers willing to transfer to ride-hailing vehicles are 
assumed to decrease as X’s service price (p) in-
creases and the vehicle effort degree (e) decreas-
es. If vehicles arrive in about the same amount of 
time as the duration of the disruption, then only 
a small portion of passengers (m0 - m1p) will use a 
ride-hailing vehicle. The transfer passenger volume 
is assumed to be a linear function of the average 
payment and vehicle effort degree ([9]), the max-
imum of which must fall below the accumulative 
passengers of the incident area as Q(p,e) < Q.
( , )Q p e p
p e Qe00 1 2 0m mm= +-
b l  (7)
where Q(p,e) denotes the stranded passengers 
transfer to ride-hailing vehicles, p is the unit price 
of ride-hailing, e is the effort expended by the 
ride-hailing vehicles, p0 is the minimum unit price 
of ride-hailing, e0 is the minimal effort expended 
by the ride-hailing vehicles, m0, m1, m2 are positive 









Figure 3 – Accumulated passenger change in Delay Model 2
3.3 Average delay loss estimation
The societal loss caused by delays in a URT dis-
ruption is mainly reflected in the time-value loss of 
passengers who endure a lengthier than normal com-
mute. The time value is also reflected in the value of 
an hourly labour force. The average time value is de-
noted as h and the average loss is defined as follows:
c ThQl =  (6)
4. RECOVERY SERVICE COMPENSATION 
APPROACH
Our analysis is centred here on a scenario in which 
a URT company collaborates with a ride-hailing compa-
ny to manage short-term disruptions (e.g., duration of 
less than two hours). An X company is used as the re-
search subject, which is a platform covering taxis and 
personal ride-hailing vehicles. The recovery service is 
a transport supply consisting of ride-hailing vehicles, 
X, and stranded passengers as participants.
We first analysed the revenue-sharing contract 
between X and the vehicles due to the large demand 
caused by the disruption. X provides immediate ser-
vices for a large number of stranded passengers, and 
transfers a portion of its revenue to encourage more 





Figure 4 – Cooperation among recovery service participants
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X’s expectation is to maximize its profit. Revenue 
mainly includes passenger payments and URT com-
pensation. Expenditures mainly include the transfer 
payment to ride-hailing vehicles and operation costs.
( , ) ( ) ( , ) ( )p e p p c Q p e B er s rP = +- -  (10)
The ride-hailing vehicle company’s expectation is 
also to maximize its profit. Revenue mainly includes 
the transfer payment from X and expenditures mainly 
include operation and effort costs.
( , ) ( ) ( , ) ( )p e p c c Q p e G es s s rP = -- -  (11)
The purpose of supply chain management is to 
maximize overall profit. In a state of centralized deci-
sion-making, X and ride-hailing vehicles are considered 
as a whole. The pricing strategy and effort strategy 
reach a global optimum. The expected profit function 
of the service supply chain is expressed as follows:
( , ) ( ) ( , ) ( ) ( )p e p c c Q p e B e G es r s rP PP = + = +- --  (12)
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Each supply chain member is assumed to be ratio-
nal, the individual decision-making serves to maximize 
respective profits, and a decrease in overall profit is 
inevitable.
4.3 Effort-based revenue-sharing contract
The revenue-sharing contract is the basic measure-
ment of supply chain coordination [14]. Under the tra-
ditional revenue-sharing contract, ride-hailing vehicles 
offer transport services on X platform. X dominates 
the supply chain and transfers a part of the service 
revenue and compensation to the ride-hailing vehicles 
under Proposition 1.
Proposition 1: The traditional revenue-sharing con-
tract cannot be coordinated.
Proof:
X’s expected profit function is
( , ) ( ) ( , ) ( )p e p p c Q p e B er s r{ {P = - - +  (15)
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stranded passenger volume of the incident area – 
its maximum is less than the accumulative passen-
gers of the incident area, as Q(p,e) < Q.
3)  Under normal circumstances, ride-hailing vehicles 
provide nearby services and do not input any extra 
effort. In a recovery scenario, X must convene more 
ride-hailing vehicles, some of which must reach the 
incident area from a distance and thus merit spe-
cial incentive to participate in the recovery (defined 
here as “effort”). It is reasonable that the cost of 
effort G(e) be a convex function of the degree of 
effort. The normal cost and marginal cost both 
increase as effort degree increases, as G'(e) > 0, 
G''(e) > 0.
( ) ( , ) ( )G e e Q p e2
1 0>2d d=  (8)
where G(e) denotes the cost of ride-hailing vehi-
cles, d is a positive coefficient to be calibrated, e is 
the effort made by the ride-hailing vehicles (greater 
effort paid indicates more vehicles participating in 
the emergency evacuation with shorter response 
time), and Q' denotes the stranded passenger vol-
ume of the incident area.
4)  The URT is inclined to provide compensation for 
recovery services in order to evacuate as many 
stranded passengers as possible. In doing so, they 
may benefit from incorporating ride-hailing vehicles 
into the recovery service. The compensation is as-
sumed as an affine function of effort degree, bh is 
the maximum compensation, b is the compensa-
tion coefficient, and e0 is the minimum effort de-
gree required.
( ) ( , ) ( , , )B e bQ eQ p e e e e b0 <> h0$b b b= =  (9)
where b is a positive evacuation coefficient to be 
calibrated, e is the effort made by the ride-hailing 
vehicles, Q' is the stranded passenger volume of 
the incident area, e0 is the minimal effort made by 
the ride-hailing vehicles, and bh is the maximum 
evacuation cost.
4.2 Recovery service supply chain analysis
Under recovery circumstances, X provides recovery 
services by conveying passengers to their destinations 
rather than feeder services of conveying passengers 
to the nearest URT stations. Recovery service supply 
chain participants include ride-hailing vehicles, X, and 
stranded passengers. X provides the service platform 
for the ride-hailing vehicles and passengers. Stranded 
passengers purchase transport service to X; X deducts 
service fees, information fees, and other fees before 
transferring the remaining payment to ride-hailing ve-
hicles.
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and X is formulated here as a URT-dominated Stack-
elberg game model which can be solved by the back-
ward induction method [15].
Step 1: Affording price p, the optimal effort degree 
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Step 2: Bringing e* into the URT expected profit func-
tion makes the optimal compensation incentive coef-
ficient b* meet the first-order conditions of the URT 
expected profit function.
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When X’s pricing strategy is known in advance, the 
compensation incentive coefficient is:
e
c p c c
2
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5. NUMERICAL ANALYSIS
5.1 Illustrations
A few numerical examples have been assessed 
to explore the URT company’s reduced loss and the 
X company’s profit under various impact parameters. 
Shanghai URT network and company X were chosen as 
subjects. A computer was used with 2.6 GHz dual-core 
CPU for computation. The input variables and parame-
ters for the model can be sorted into four groups.
1)  Variables related to the URT disruption include the 
four stations between the Tongji university station 
and Jiangwan stadium station (Line 10) as one inci-
dent area; these four stations were selected as our 
analysis subject. The disruption occurs at 11:00, 
the recovery service approaches at 11:30, then the 
four stations are restored at 13:00, and the sta-
tions resume original operation at 13:30.
2)  Variables related to the passengers (e.g., arrival 
and departure rates) were obtained from workday 
operation data in October of 2016. The mean ar-
rival rate of the study area was 721 passengers 
per station per hour and the mean departure rate 
was 731 passengers per station per hour between 
11:00 and 14:00. The number of initial stranded 
passengers at each station was assumed to be 
450. “Impatient” passengers were assumed to 
leave the station at a rate in direct proportion to 
the passenger arrival rate, }iu=0.3}ia. Delay Mod-
el 2 was used to calculate the stranded passenger 
volume. The average time value of the passengers 
The optimal price p*{  must be equal to p* to reach 
supply chain coordination. The optimal transfer pay-
ment can be obtained, ( ) ,p c c1s s r{ {= + -  and the 
ride-hailing vehicles’ expected revenue can be further 
calculated as follows:
( , ) ( ) ( ) ( , ) ( )p e p c c Q p e G e1s s r{P = -- - -  (17)































Because , ( ) ,B e0 0> >' *{  then .e p e p<* *{ ^ ^h h  Sup-
ply chain coordination cannot be achieved. It is rea-
sonable that the ride-hailing vehicles bear an overall 
effort cost G(e), but receive only a partial payment 
( ) ( ) ( , ) .p c c Q p e1 s r{- - -  Thus, the effort degree 
made by the vehicles is lower than the supply chain’s 
optimal effort degree.
We propose a revenue-sharing contract model 
based on effort cost-sharing, where X company shares 
the effort cost at a rate denoted as n.
Proposition 2: If { and ps satisfy Equation 20, the 
effort-based revenue-sharing contract reaches the ap-
propriate degree of coordination.




= + -^ h(  (19)
Proof:
If , ( ) ,p c c1s s r{{ n {= = + -  X’s expected profit func-
tion is:
( , ) ( ) ( , ) ( ) ( )
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X’s expected profit function is an affine function of 
the service supply chain’s profit function. The reve-
nue-sharing contract is thus coordinated. The value of 
{ is mainly determined by negotiation between X and 
the ride-hailing vehicles, and the optimal pricing strat-
egy is reflected in Equation 12.
4.4 Recovery service compensation model
The URT seeks maximum evacuation effects with 
minimum compensation. The expected profit is the re-
duction of societal loss.
, ( , ) ( )
( , ) ( ) ( )
O Q c Q Q p e c Q p e p B e
Q p e c p B e
l l
l
0 0= - - + +
= - -
^^ ^ hh h
 (21)
During the recovery service, X works under the 
participation constraint that URT makes the minimum 
effort (e ≥ e0) while attempting to maximize the profit 
function with optimal effort. The game between URT 
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to collaborate with X if the price reaches this value. 
It was also found that volumes increase as prices de-
crease more significantly with recovery service than 
without recovery service; the volume difference is 
particularly significant when service price is low. It is 
worthwhile to promote recovery services for stranded 
passenger evacuation under disruption. The transfer 
rate and profit of both companies increase as the ser-
vice prices decrease. In other words, it is profitable for 
X to collaborate with the URT for the recovery service 






















11.00 13.00 15.00 17.00 19.00 21.00 23.00
Without recovery service With recovery service
Figure 5 – Q(p,e) changes with different p*  
(“with or without”)
5.3 Sensitivity analysis
Case 1: Individual impact of service price
According to the X’s lowest service price constraint 
and URT’s compensation constraint, the service price 
is restricted between 11 and 23. The recovery com-
pensation (Equation 9) and X marginal expected profit 
(Equation 15) was calculated as shown in Figure 6a. We 
further calculated the URT expected profit (Equation 21) 
as shown in Figure 6b. The recovery compensation and 
was calculated as per the average salary of the 
city (37 yuan/hour in 2016). The average commute 
distance of URT passengers was obtained from an 
annual traffic survey report as 15.8 kilometres in 
2016. 
3)  Variables related to X involve the service price 
(comprised of distance price and duration price). 
The distance unit price changes from 0.6 to 2 per 
kilometre; the duration unit price is assumed to be 
0.4 per minute, and the values can be adjusted ac-
cording to actual data. The minimum charge was 
11 yuan/person as of 2016. The travel speed of 
ground transportation changes from 15 to 40 as 
congestion varies – the mean value was 30 kilome-
tres per hour in Shanghai in 2016. The travel speed 
affects the recovery service duration when travel 
distance is constant.
4)  Due to unavailable data, we simply assumed some 
parameters to be constant values for passenger 
loss estimation (Table 1).
5.2  “With or without” comparison
Under the given assumptions, the accumula-
tive passenger volume (Equation 4) and average loss 
(Equation 6) were first calculated based on Delay 
Model 2. The optimal compensation incentive coef-
ficients (Equation 24) were then calculated according 
to different service prices to obtain the optimal effort 
degree (Equation 23) and accumulative passengers 
(Equation 7). The URT expected profit (Equation 21) was 
calculated last. The results without any recovery ser-
vice were also obtained for comparison as plotted in 
Figure 5. 
It was found that transfer passenger volume de-
creases monotonically as service price increases in 
Models 1 and 2. The transfer passenger volume with 
recovery service fell below the volume without recov-
ery service when the price was 22.91; the URT refuses 
Table 1 – Input parameter values (Numerical example)
Parameter Notation Value
Response time T0 0.5h
Repair time T1 1.5h
Restoration time T2 0.5h
Basic transfer coefficient m0 0.2
Price impact coefficient m1 0.01
Effort impact coefficient m2 0.2
Effort cost parameter d 5
X operation cost per person cr 1 yuan
Ride-hailing vehicle operation cost per person cs 3 yuan
X sharing proportion of revenue sharing contact { 0.2
Minimal effort degree e0 0.5
Maximum compensation per person bh 5 yuan
Average passengers per vehicle 2.5 persons/vehicle
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Case 2: Individual impact of vehicle travel speed
We next tested indicator values of 1 yuan/km dis-
tance unit price and 0.4 yuan/min duration unit price 
with vehicle travel speeds from 15 to 40 at a step-wise 
increase of 1 to calculate optimal transfer passenger 
volume and X expected profit (Figure 8). The transfer 
passenger volume and X’s expected profit both in-
crease as travel speed increases. It is reasonable that 
more passengers are inclined to use ride-hailing vehi-
cles to save time but less so if ground traffic is congest-
ed. X’s expected profit reaches its maximum when ve-
hicle speed is 32 km/h, and slightly declines as speed 
accelerates. It is reasonable that better transport and 
pricing conditions inspire more vehicles to expend ef-



































Vehicle travel speed [km/h]
11.00 13.00 15.00 17.00 19.00 21.00 23.00
X’s expected profit Transfer passengers
Figure 8 – Q(p,e) and Pr(p,e) changes with different vehicle 
travel speed
6. CONCLUSION
In this study, we explored URT decision-making in 
providing disruption recovery services for stranded 
passengers evacuation in collaborating with ride-hail-
ing companies (company “X”). Extant research on this 
subject has centred on bus-bridging and feeder ser-
vices – we propose instead an effective collaboration 
between URT and a ride-hailing company X for strand-
ed passengers evacuation and destination-based 
services. We established a recovery service supply 
chain model encompassing ride-hailing vehicles, X, 
and stranded passengers, then built an effort-based 
revenue-sharing contract for the coordinated chain in 
which X’s pricing strategy can be adjusted as neces-
sary. We also explored the URT’s recovery compensa-
tion decision-making process based on a Stackelberg 
game model wherein the profit functions of the par-
ticipants’ decisions are explicitly assessed and an in-
centive coefficient parameter for the URT decision and 
solver is utilized.
This study was not without limitations. For in-
stance, the impact of various aspects of the disrup-
tion (e.g., incident areas and time brackets) were ne-
glected. More sophisticated models are necessary to 
fully capture the characteristics of disruption recovery 
URT’s expected profit both decrease as price increas-
es; X’s expected profit reaches its maximum at the 
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Figure 6b – B(e) and O changes with different service price
The effort cost (Equation 8) and service supply 
chain expected profit (Equation 12) were calculated 
as shown in Figure 7. Generally speaking, ride-hailing 
vehicles pay less effort when prices are low. The URT 
could pay greater compensation for recovery services 
when prices decline to encourage ride-hailing vehicles 
to expend greater effort. The service supply chain ex-
pected profit reaches its maximum at unit compensa-
































11.00 13.00 15.00 17.00 19.00 21.00 23.00
Service supply chain profit Effort cost
Figure 7 – G(e) and P(p,e) changes with different service 
price
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planning. Our delay model could also be further im-
proved – the parameters yet need to be calibrated by 
more operation data. Using another simulation model 
as a comparison could more directly reveal the strand-
ed passengers accumulation effects. Additionally, a 
more balanced analysis may be conducted by applying 
the method to a larger set of alternative solutions in 
parallel (e.g. combining shuttle buses and trams in ad-
dition to ride-hailing vehicles as recovery service pro-
viders). In the future, we plan to consider these factors 
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